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1 May 1967

OCO Vietnam Training Program: Preliminary Report

1. At the end of the first two weeks the course is beginning to take some shape.
2. The first unit of three weeks is designed to give the cultural and historical background of Vietnam. The general pattern has been that of the National War College, i.e. a presentation by an authority followed by a discussion. This is not the liveliest form of teaching, however the speakers have been well selected and the audience seemed interested. I suspect that a long diet of this type will lead to a feeling of surfeit. The one variation from this pattern was to break up the class into several groups to take part in a theoretical exercise centered on coping with [REDACTED] 25X1A
Unfortunately not enough time was allocated for it and other staffing arrangements were poorly handled. Nevertheless more activity of this kind is highly desirable, in short more student active participation.
3. This class is unusual in having a majority with previous military experience in Vietnam. This makes a very good mix with the others who are civilians who have not been to Vietnam. It would be good to have this a constant pattern, regrettably not in the cards, because the military have contributed a great deal of solid knowledge. The aim here is to make them as politically conscious as possible. This is not going to work in all cases,

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judging from some bewildered remarks. Nevertheless it is by and large a good class.

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4. The general management tone is becoming apparent. [REDACTED] was present for only a few days (he has returned to Saigon for another two months) but made his views clear.

5. The two course managers, Lewis Pots and Everett Bumgardner are from U.S.I.A. [REDACTED] says that he is satisfied with them although he would have preferred that one of them come for AID. It is clear that as far as he is concerned OCO is an AID/USIA show. CIA, I gather, is to contribute and "make itself useful".

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6. If this pattern remains firm, some consideration should be given to sending to the course only those in whom the Agency will have no further interest after their arrival in the field.

7. For those in whom we shall maintain an intelligence interest there is no reason why we could not send them to the first culture section of three weeks (this could probably be shortened to two weeks in due time). The second so-called "operational" section is already somewhat duplicative of what we are already planning to do ourselves. This section can be better done by ourselves and I think should be an in house performance for those who are too concerned to any degree whatsoever with intelligence,